IN THE NAME OF PROTECTION: THE DILEMMA OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Abstract

The issue of whether states can legally use force against another state to stop mass atrocities is undoubtedly one of the most controversial debates in contemporary international law. The present article asserts that there is no unilateral right of humanitarian intervention (UHI) in international law and, more significantly, that there should be none. It reiterates that the emphasis on such a right is motivated not by any legal necessity but by the need (of some) to legitimize coercion via moral rhetoric. The reasoning is trifurcated, encompassing legal, historical and structural dimensions. Legally, UHI finds no foundation in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter), the self-defence exception under Article 51, the doctrine of necessity under the Articles on State Responsibility, or customary international law. Historically, the logic underlying UHI descends in an unbroken line from colonial civilizing missions and League of Nations mandates to post-Cold War R2P, each iteration reproducing the same hierarchy between protector and protected under a different name. Structurally, five recurring pathologies, including selectivity, mission creep, resource misallocation, collateral damage, and moral hazard, exist. Together, these indicate systematic failure even against their own stated objectives. The crisis in Gaza, in which over 72,000 people have been killed, serves as the litmus test. It exposes, with painful clarity, how humanitarian norms are invoked selectively. It shows how institutions are obstructed by the states that claim to uphold those norms elsewhere. The article concludes that the path forward lies not in refining the conditions for intervention, but in building an architecture that is preventive, collective, and regionally grounded. The goal is not a world in which force is better regulated; it is a world that no longer needs to reach for it.