CONSENSUS POLITICS AND CONSOCIATIONALISM: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

Abstract

Many post-colonial states, inherited constitutional and political framework that leaned towards centralization, thereby causing tension among various ethnic groups. The challenge of segmental division has been a significant issue faced by these countries since their independence. Various experiments and models by different governments aimed at addressing these divisions, however, fell short of achieving the desired outcomes. To address this persistent issue, political scientists have consistently advocated for a profound alteration and adaptation of the political system, employing diverse strategies. This paper aims to explain consensus politics and consociationalism, distinguish consociationalism from majoritarian democracy and examine how societal structure influence the adoption of a specific political framework. Simultaneously, it discusses how consociational democracy offers viable solutions to segmental divisions and the resultant political instability. Observing its adoption in many countries around the world, effectively resolving these issues, contributes significantly to a comprehensive understanding of prolonged political crises and the underlying causes of democratic instability in countries such as Pakistan. The paper employs a qualitative, analytical approach based on an extensive review of primary and secondary sources. It draws mainly on the original works of Arend Lijphart to compare the theoretical foundations, key features, and practical implications of majoritarian and consociational models of democracy.