The Geneva Accords of 1954 and Their Legacy for Conflict, Justice and Social Order in Post-War Vietnam

Abstract

This article examines the 1954 Geneva Agreement as an “unfinished” ceasefire, shedding light on its long-term legacy for conflict, justice, and social order in Vietnam. Rather than approaching the Agreement primarily from a diplomatic or military perspective, the study situates it within an interdisciplinary theoretical framework encompassing peace studies, transitional justice, and conflict transformation. Employing historical analysis and textual analysis, the article demonstrates that while the Geneva Agreement succeeded in achieving negative peace by bringing an end to direct armed violence, it failed to establish the foundations for positive peace. This failure stemmed from the absence of enforceable political mechanisms, transitional justice arrangements, and processes of social reconciliation. The findings suggest that the lack of such mechanisms contributed to the reproduction of structural violence, the persistence of antagonistic collective memories, and the emergence of a post-war social order characterized by limited societal consensus. By tracing these dynamics, the article highlights how a ceasefire-oriented settlement can inadvertently entrench unresolved grievances and latent conflict. On this basis, the study draws broader implications for both theory and practice in peacebuilding, emphasizing the necessity of integrating justice, reconciliation, and social reconstruction into ceasefire agreements in order to move beyond temporary stability toward sustainable peace in post-conflict societies.