Engineering Multilateral Diplomacy: Molotov and the Soviet Preparation for the Geneva Conference, 1954

Abstract

The 1954 Geneva Conference has commonly been studied from the perspective of the course of negotiations and the outcomes of the agreements concerning Indochina. Yet a substantial part of the diplomatic activity took place before the conference formally opened. This article analyses the Soviet Union’s preparations for the Geneva Conference under the coordination of Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, treating Geneva as a significant case of multilateral diplomacy in the context of the Cold War. Drawing on Soviet, US, British, and Chinese diplomatic documents, together with relevant historical scholarship, the article reconstructs three dimensions of the preparatory process: information gathering and the definition of the negotiating space; coordination with China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; and the preparation of the negotiating team and contingency plans. The study employs the concept of “diplomatic engineering” to describe the deliberate construction of informational, political, coalition-building, and procedural conditions before formal negotiations began. The findings indicate that the Soviet Union’s negotiating capacity at Geneva was substantially prepared before the conference itself. Such preparation, however, did not amount to the ability to control the outcome. The article argues that a full understanding of multilateral diplomacy requires attention not only to what takes place at the table, but also to the process of constructing the table.