Constitutional Gridlock and Judicial Intervention: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Activism and Legislative Supremacy

Abstract

Constitutional stalemate can lead to institutional impasse, which can cause judicial and legislative conflicts, and raise serious doubts about the power and boundaries of the judicial branch. The present study investigates the continuing controversy between judicial activism and legislative supremacy through a study of the practice of judicial review in the era of political deadlock, while maintaining democratic accountability and the rule of law. The study involves qualitative doctrinal and comparative legal research methodology to examine competing constitutional doctrines and institutional responses to governance crises in the United States, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan and South Africa through a constitution, landmark judicial decisions and scholarly literature. The analysis suggests that judicial activism, if properly handled, can be a constitutional remedy against legislative inaction and executive overreach, especially in times of constitutional crisis. But the judiciary's over-ambitious role in politics can have a detrimental effect on the rule of law, the separation of powers and democratic legitimacy. The study is a conclusion that neither absolute judicial supremacy nor completely unlimited legislative supremacy can sustain a constitutional model. Rather, a more effective way to defuse constitutional deadlock without compromising constitutional stability and democratic processes and public trust in institutions is to establish a balanced system of limited judicial oversight and institutional dialogue. The findings shed light on contemporary debates about constitutionalism, judicial governance, and the changing role of courts in democratic societies.