

From Being to Becoming: An Existentialist Study of Nietzschean Metamorphosis of Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment

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Abstract

This research explores Dostoevsky's 'Crime and Punishment' through Nietzsche's theory of the three metamorphoses of the spirit the Camel, the Lion, and the Child as introduced in 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra'. The research answers the basic question: what makes a man change spiritually. It claims that the character portrayed by Raskolnikov can be called a staged existential development, which can be aligned with the allegoric version of the human development provided by Nietzsche. At the Camel stage, Raskolnikov shares the guilt attached to inherited moral and ideological contradictions, and he is a slave at the mercy of a number of duties, poverty, and guilt. His shift towards the Lion phase is described by the killing of the pawnbroker, which is an intentional rejection of the traditional concept of morality and an effort to establish his highness with the help of the transgressive independence. Such a revolt, however, is spiritually disastrous and causes the loss of companionship, psychological breakdown and nihilistic despair. Only at the last stage, similar to the Child, Raskolnikov finds himself ready to accept the possibility of a new life by becoming vulnerable, humane, and open to experiencing human compassion, namely, in the form of Sonya loving him. Although in his story Dostoevsky chooses the kind of a redemptive Christian vision over what Nietzsche urges us to do, which is to create values autonomously, the novel strongly resembles the model of self-overcoming and moral transformation presented by Nietzsche. This interdisciplinary approach reveals 'Crime and Punishment' not merely as a moral or theological narrative but as a literary enactment of the modern crisis of values, and a dramatization of the complex journey from burdened conformity, to nihilistic revolt, to spiritual rebirth. This research contends the fact of only Christian Salvation of Raskolnikov rather it shows more complex philosophical redemption and healing that works like a case study of self help where readers can see the obvious stages of human transformation.

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Introduction

The Crime and Punishment by Fyodor Dostoevsky (1866) is one of the greatest pieces of psychological fiction works, philosophical investigation, and existential drama. It is the story of the intellectual, moral and spiritual breakdown, and subsequent rebirth, of a young, impoverished ex-student, Rodion Raskolnikov who murders a pawnbroker in an experiment in psychology. The story is not only about the crime, but also about destruction of self inside and the complicated mechanism through which a human being tries to justify, rebel and at the end accept the right and wrong and sufferings. The critics have interpreted Raskolnikov with

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the multiplicity of lenses over the generations: the Orthodox Christianity, Marxism, utilitarianism, nihilism, and psychoanalysis, to name a few. However, there is an unbelievably overlooked method of reading Raskolnikov which involves one of the most revealing ways of looking at the transformation of Raskolnikov, which can be looked at through Friedrich Nietzsche and his theory of Three Metamorphoses of Spirit; the Camel, the Lion and the Child.

Established in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the three metamorphoses introduced by Nietzsche are an existential paradigm on how human spirit evolves under the fall of inherited codes of morality. The Camel, that is the first metamorphosis, portrays the person who is a victim of taken-in morality, tradition, and social responsibility. Camel responds to the burden of tradition with the answer of “yes” which, through strength of endurance and self-denial, had been made strong (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 27). The second step is the Lion, rebellious spirit that penetrates the desert of existential loneliness to fight the great dragon, which is the embodiment of absolute, inherited value *Thou Shalt*. It is the mission of the Lion to say No, to destroy, to negate, the old in the way that freedom can be possible. The Lion is not capable of creating yet: he/she is only able to liberate by a negation (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 27). The real rebirth of the spirit is metamorphosis in the last stage, the Child. The Child reaffirms life by playing around or creatively coming up with values absent of anger or recourse to the past. It is the sign of innocence, fresh start, and the sacred yes (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 28). Yet this schema which is symbolic and poetic, is an exacting existential framework of understandings through the three movements of sense: suffering, rebellion and renewal, of the movement of human consciousness.

Despite the difference in their philosophical views, especially the views on morality and religion, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky have much in common in preoccupation with the outcome of value collapse and the attempt of the modern subject to find meaning. Although the world picture Dostoevsky develops is finally Christian and redemptive, and that of Nietzsche post-theistic and creative, both philosophers struggle with the psychological price of freedom, the impossibility of rational systems to provide a basis of morals, and the ability to surmount oneself by means of crisis. It is, therefore, interesting to interpret the episodes that characterize Raskolnikov as a Nietzschean rebirth of the soul, in the sense that the protagonist experiences a series of existential metamorphoses of crises and consciousness. The narrator describes Raskolnikov as dynamic and as being involved in a complicated psychological and philosophical becoming rather than as a stable and linear character.

This study holds that *Crime and Punishment* can be understood under the tripartite model of Nietzsche as an account of metamorphosis in existence. Every point of the character development of Raskolnikov can be referred to one of the spiritual transformations Nietzsche went through. During the Camel stage, ideological inconsistency, social responsibility and family/society obligations are burdens to Raskolnikov. He lacks strength to fight in the name of utilitarian rationalism or that of Christian morality and is torn apart by the guilt, pride and intellectual abstractedness. This is his inner burden and he carries it in passivity and suffering. He has the dream of being great at moral heroism, but he fails to take action. The clash of values passed on by his ancestors crushes in his mind and he is not able to pass beyond that stage (Dostoevsky, 1991, pp. 945).

During the Lion phase, Raskolnikov revolts. He creates symbolic as well as literal rejection of moral law when he murders Alyona Ivanovna, the pawnbroker. The play is not only a crime story, but also presented as an intellectual experiment- is it possible to become great by leaving good and evil behind? Raskolnikov tries to be rid of guilt, God and handed down morals. But his revolt as a Lion is not complete and psychologically disastrous. He cannot maintain his will and his negation pushes him toward alienation, sickness and spiritual division. The Lion created by Nietzsche is meant to cause havoc and destruction with purpose and power; Raskolnikov ends up in shame, confusion, and desperation. He shouts, but is not able to say Yes (Dostoevsky, 1991, pp. 70254; Nietzsche, 2006, p. 27).

And, finally, in Child phase, Raskolnikov starts to wake up in his new life, but slowly, hurtfully, and without any wind blowing. In Siberia, he has not only the quiet friendship of Sonya, but also his intellectual conceit obliterated by his awareness of the new values, which are neither of domination, rationalization, nor of rebellion but of humiliation, suffering and love. Nietzsche Child is the emblem of the re-administrative of the will, the playful construction of values that are not based on blaming and refuting. Swift and dramatic in its telling, Raskolnikov undergoes an analogue existential change, albeit without the Nietzschean characteristics of the *Übermensch*. His metaphysical sickness leads to incipient openness, and at the end of the novel he starts experiencing the vibrations of genuine change: he could start living once again, he could not die of life (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 492). The version of Child as given by Dostoevsky is also imbedded with grace of Christ and not Nietzschean creation, yet the plotline follows the metamorphosis of the spirit at the end.

Such an interpretation of Crime and Punishment can, therefore, help in obtaining a more comprehensive interpretation on one hand, of Dostoevsky characterization and on the other hand, Nietzsche symbolism of existence. Instead of perceiving Raskolnikov as merely a moral allegory, or an ideological victim, we may suppose he is a representative of a modern evolution of spiritual man, a man tied up in a pile of ruins of a decayed moral world, desperately attempting to eradicate his inherited values and, at the end of it all, learning, through his suffering, how to assert life once more. The system of Nietzsche does not in any sense efface the Christian message conveyed by Dostoevsky, but it coincides with him on the existential plane of process. It is the conflict of rebellion and redemption, will and grace, negation and affirmation that is at the heart of the metamorphosis of Raskolnikov as it is extraordinarily psychologically meaningful and philosophically significant.

Using this Nietzschean perspective, the novel turns out not only to be a work of study in guilt and repentance, but it is an active process of existential becoming. The Camel, Lion, and Child do not only mean something but a philosophical level represented in one of the most mysterious characters in the literature. Tracking these transformations in Raskolnikov we achieve not only a new insight on the work of Dostoevsky, but also a greater understanding of the call of Nietzsche on the modern man: to be what you are, to destroy, to suffer, to create as a reference to the divine play of the creation of new things.

Literature Review:

The critical reception of Fyodor Dostoevsky's 'Crime and Punishment' has long centred on its psychological depth, theological symbolism, and philosophical ambiguity. Being a masterpiece writing of the 19th century, it still captures analysing interpretations through different disciplinary and ideological angles. Raskolnikov has been discussed by scholars in terms of theology, morality, psychoanalysis, existential critique and politics, evidencing the novel itself as sympathetic to polyphonic meaning. The three major trends in critical response to Dostoevsky are explained within a more or less coherent landscape: the part played in it by the relation of Dostoevsky to the crisis of modernity the breakdown of the traditional system of morality and the rise of individualistic and anti-foundational ideologies. This work can be continued judging by the course of that track and examining the development of the character of Raskolnikov based on the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche within his three metamorphoses of spirit, which gives a new way of development of Dostoevskian and Nietzschean history.

The religious dimension of 'Crime and Punishment' has traditionally dominated scholarship, especially in Russian and Western Christian critical traditions. An example can be discussed as follows: Joseph Frank (1995) considers the novel as the literary reaction of Dostoevsky to nihilism and utilitarian ethics, which could be summarised through the redemptive nature of Christian humility and suffering. Frank claims that the criminal act of Raskolnikov is not the act of social justice but rather the act of playing God, a Promethean idea of overcoming divine moral order; the eventual salvation, therefore, lies in the good example of the self-sacrificing love Sonya embodies (Frank, 1995, pp. 450-452). On the same note Malcolm Jones (2005) writes on the biblical references in the text, including the concept of resurrection, crucifixion and spiritual cleansing. The scholars typically interpret Raskolnikov as moving out of arrogance and faithlessness and into grace and atonement and trace rather smoothly the course of his sinfulness into gracefulness.

Such readings are still convincing but they do not fully exhaust the philosophical sophistication of the novel. It has been noted by many critics that it is not only religious but highly existential and epistemological in nature that Raskolnikov undergoes a psychological turmoil. Not only does he have to choose between good and evil, but between opposing systems of philosophies: utilitarianism, moral relativism, determinism and exceptionalism of an individual. The ideological plurality in the work of Dostoevsky is stressed by James Scanlan (2002) who adds that in the novel the author incorporates in his fiction the major ideological battles in the field of Russian intellectual life between faith and atheism, reason and intuition, collectivism and individualism (p. 67). Raskolnikov is a resident of a modern environment, and so the theory of the extraordinary man, his terror of moral exception and his power fantasies in a quasi-Napoleonic style, places Raskolnikov squarely in an era where the traditional authority had been swept away to leave a vacuum.

This conflict has much in common with the arguments of Friedrich Nietzsche whose criticism of morality, guilt, and resentment replicate many of the same sides which Dostoevsky had expressed. Although Nietzsche famously wrote in 'Ecce Homo' (1908) that Dostoevsky was "the only psychologist from whom I have anything to learn," their philosophical differences are as notable as their similarities (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 137). Dostoevsky testifies to the truth of Christian redemption, to moral reality; Nietzsche declares

the death of God and prescribes the need to overturn all values. Researchers like Robert Jackson (2004) however have highlighted their common diagnosis on modernity, fragmentation of values, crisis of identity, and development of nihilism. Jackson claims that the two authors found themselves in a similar situation dealing with the problem of how the human being may face the world wherein God is dead but morality still lurked in the conscience (p. 89).

Nietzsche's theory of the three metamorphoses introduced in 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' has been discussed primarily in relation to his broader project of self-overcoming and value creation. The Camel, Lion, and Child, as explained by Daniel Conway (1997) are just the symbolic phases of development of the individual spirit as depicted by Nietzsche. The Camel embodies the submissiveness to the norms of morality, the Lion symbolizes its breaking and the Child enters the period of creative establishment of new values (Conway, 1997, pp. 112-115). Such metaphoric process provides such a philosophical anthropology where the subject can experience a transformation of passive burden-bearing into active rebellion and into the jubilant self-creation. Literary characters currently do not have a lot of application of this triad model but is generally enticing. According to John Lippitt (2009), the three metamorphoses give a general yet rich framework in terms of interpretations of existential development particularly in stories that encompass moral crisis and new birth (p. 74).

In the Crime and Punishment case, Nietzsche model illuminates some of the factors in the change of Raskolnikov that is not entirely clear through theological or purely psychological explanations. According to Gary Rosenshield (2005) in the comparative analysis of Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, when Raskolnikov expresses his superman theory or his will to rise beyond good and evil, he is following the Nietzschean tropes which are destined to fail as he is doing without ever possessing real will to power or affirmation (p. 120). Raskolnikov tries to destroy morality, still is full of guilt and emotional servitude. The murder of the pawnbroker is his Lion act that is done in a theoretical duress, not in sovereign freedom. The argument by Rosenshield substantiates the opinion that Raskolnikov is an unsuccessful Nietzschean a representor of the path to self-overcoming, but failures to pass through it because of unsolved internal contradictions.

Based on this fact, other scholars like Paul Contino (1997) have focused on the relational and emotional aspects of the change that Raskolnikov undergoes. Contino writes that "Raskolnikov's redemption is not philosophical but affective: it comes through Sonya, not through dialectic" (p. 193). This creates a twist in the Nietzsche model which points towards personal maturity and independence. Still, the passage between negation (Lion) and affirmation (Child) even though presented in a different form by Dostoevsky, reflects a sense of the creative self that will be created through destruction, as Nietzsche would put it. The conclusion of Dostoevsky, who suggests but does not yet achieve the spiritual resurrection of Raskolnikov encourages an interpretation that integrates Nietzschean becoming into Christian regeneration.

The present study enriches those very important discussions by introducing a systematic Nietzschean interpretation of the psychological and moral transformation of Raskolnikov, which is explicitly traced with references to the three metamorphoses. Although

past expositions of the studies have alluded to the relationship between Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, there is minimal exposure of a lengthy and performed analysis of Raskolnikov in the light of the metaphorical system of Nietzsche. In such a way, not only the philosophical aspect of Dostoevsky as the creator of the character development, but also that of the form in which this development is given in the narration is covered by this project. According to it, the conflict between sin and salvation is not the only significant aspect dramatized by *Crime and Punishment*; the entire matter of value destruction and reconstruction is also represented dramatically in this work.

Theoretical Framework:

This research can be supported by the existential philosophical system of Friedrich Nietzsche with the doctrine of the three metamorphoses of the spirit of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Being a conceptual formation, the metamorphoses of Nietzsche create a symbolic, ideological scheme of transformation of the human form in response to a crisis of meaning of the modernity. These metamorphoses have a role beyond metaphor, as an ontological and epistemological paradigm of becoming-self, as it describes the passage of consciousness away from burdened submission to the radical affirmation.

Nietzsche does not lament the demise of true moral, religious, and metaphysical world views in this destruction instead he proclaims that it is a chance to re-create values through a creative revaluation of values. This opportunity is voiced by his model of metamorphosis, which includes the Camel, the Lion, and the Child, and is the spiritual-existential advancement. All the stages are thoroughly-determining forms of existence, which is determined by the relation of the individual self and the values inherited, opposed, or fabricated. Consequently, the model turns into a philosophical prism of comprehending the construction of subjectivity, freedom, and autonomy in literature and, in life.

1. The Camel: The Carrier of the Values of Forefathers

The first type of metamorphosis is one of the Camel, which is an animal which bends its knees so as to be loaded up with weight. Nietzsche uses camel as an example of strength in endurance an image of the spirit that takes hard burdens, not only of duty, but also of the received rule, the religious law, the culture and the morality absolutes. The Camel questions not such values, but assimilates them. It is not always a period of ignorance but of internalised asceticism whereby the identity of the individual is henceforth formed by sacrificing and being obedient and subject to the pre-existing authority.

The Camel phase can be interpreted as allegorical representation of the pre-modern or traditionally moral subject, the subject where the virtue resides in the self-denial and in conformity. According to Nietzsche, such a mode is attributed to the slave morality which is value system based on feeling guilty, humble, and subservient. It is the ethical institution that Christianity has been propagating through rewarding weakness and punishment of strength by magnifying compassion through ideals like being meek, pity and being wretched.

But the Camel is not to be rejected of hand. To Nietzsche this must be a necessary stage; it ensures the building of a rich store of spiritual strength by the confrontation of the individual with adversity. What is built here is stamina that is used as raw material of

transformation in the future. But without evolution the Camel loses itself in the monotony of repetition and cannot even invent or validate life. It lives and yet it does not live the genuine life.

2. The Lion: Destructive Freedom and Will to Deny

The second metamorphosis the Lion is an animal of rebellion. The Lion as something that comes out of the desert symbolizes the spirit that rebels against everything that it used to hold dear. It can be defined as the symbolic role towards displacement of the religious and moral tradition idols. Uttered by Nietzsche, there is this Lion, who is obliged to bit the dragon, bigger than a dragon, with a name of Thou Shalt, and all the scales of the dragon shine by the centuries of his commandments and unquestionable truths.

It is nihilistic bravery on the part of the Lion. It dares not to obey, dares not to kneel and dares say No to meaning externally imposed. This is an important, iconoclastic, and rebellious phase. By carrying out a deconstructive not to say liberatory act, i.e. by rejecting the absolute, by rejecting objective morality, the herd instinct, the Lion is making a claim to its autonomy vis-a-vis the authority. it is the rise of the will to power in its negative form: the will to undo oneself.

But Nietzsche is precise enough when he states that the Lion is not yet creating new values. It is strong in resistance but not in innocence and playfulness that is needed in creation. This reflects the modern nihilistic crisis: no longer does the old system of morality exist, and without it nothing is present. The Lion has been trapped in the metaphysical no man's land that lacks dogmas but lacks any weighted meaning. It is heroic by nothing, but in-complete in thinking.

During this phase the spirit faces the threat of paralyzing itself due to the self-resistance. Nietzsche alerts that it is impossible to be in constant opposition, destruction has to yield to affirmation. Unless the Lion be more than a denier, either it falls back into despair or it falls back upon the certainties of earlier days. So finally the Lion is not the last metamorphosis, so it becomes a passport.

3. The Child: Creative Innocence and Affirmative Icon

The third and last metamorphosis is the Child which Nietzsche refers to as the spirit of sacred Yes. It is not, however, a restoration to innocence, but a philosophical procreation of a post-critical self, which is no longer the slave of tradition or the paralysed rebel. The Child is the creative soul that plays, imagines and lives by his own self-generated values. The Child, unlike the Camel that is very obedient, and the Lion is very resisting, is the one that shows innocence, spontaneity, and is thus capable of making things new.

The Child here becomes the first representation of undergoing the affirming will to power no longer as power over others but in the capacity to create meaning on its own. The world is no more seen in another light that of accepted dogmas or burned out values, but it is plunged into as a field of creation. Nietzsche refers this stage to the *Übermensch* (Superman), the being that violates good and evil, one that has reconciled himself or herself with being, and that is living aesthetic-existential liberation.

The possibility of eternal recurrence the power to become able to reiterate life as a whole, in its suffering, absurdity, and finitude, is represented in the Child. The Yes of the Child is to the world, as it is and not as it should be. It is the way of life which does not long for redemption beyond the immanence of the present, but lives creatively in the present.

Nietzsche and Metamorphoses of Self as Dialectic Model of Selfhood

The three metamorphoses by Nietzsche are dialectical of existential individuation. This is not a linear path to get from weakness to strength, but highly sophisticated philosophical paradigm of value-deconstruction and reconstruction, which is closely connected with the aspects of Nietzsche critique of modernity and metaphysics. Camel-Lion-Child is a description of a transition between an imposed identity to self-constructed existence between reactive morality to a creative affirmation.

The model also traces more general philosophy of man: human being is a becoming an incomplete project that it is defined by the interactions it has with historical, moral, and spiritual forces. Nietzsche does not provide despair in the world where universal truths melted together and in which God is dead, instead, he provides an appeal to radical creation. It is through the metamorphoses that the man is directed out of inherited meaning systems towards creation of original, immanent values.

Each step is associated with very specific ideological posturing: the Camel conveys pre-modern theological orthodoxy and moralist superstitiousness; the Lion represents Enlightenment judgment and existential emptiness; and the Child a post-nihilist defect in the construction of an affirmative self. In that sense this structure is not merely existential, it is also profoundly ideological: it is an indictment of the natures of contemporary subjectivity, and a vision of its reconstruction.

Analysis and Interpretation

The analysis delves into the textual evidence of spiritual evolution of Raskolnikov. It is divided into three stages:

Part I: Raskolnikov, The Camel -The Moral Burden and Idealism

The first metamorphosis of the Spirit identified by Nietzsche is the Camel, attached by endurance, subjection, and taking of the burdens placed on society, religion and philosophical standards. The Camel is the one who internalizes the Thou shalt of tradition, who can be strong because he is self-denying and being up to some moral duty, yet, selfish and covered with a chains. Applying to *Crime and Punishment* by Fyodor Dostoevsky, the Camel manifests itself brightly through the beginning state of the psyche of Rodion Raskolnikov. Overloaded by the weight of poverty, moral idealism, utilitarian theory and a family obligation, the consciousness of Raskolnikov is filled not only with the traditional ideologies, but also with the abstractions of moral thoughts. With his subsequent rebelliousness (that may be said to nullify such forces) we may deal later; but his condition at first is that of Nietzsche in his first metamorphosis: he is the laborious beast of burden, torn and separated within himself and psychologically crushed by the burden of contradiction.

At the beginning of the novel Raskolnikov is in the state of paralysis and suffering, where he feels moral seriousness as well as self-hating. He is a former pupil who leads an extreme poor lifestyles in St. Petersburg which is unemployed and isolative. His solitary mind is filled with thinking, idealism and theoretical abstraction. Nietzsche says that the Camel bows to the ground and prefers to be heavily loaded, and he does not mind hard work since this is good (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 27). Likewise this suffering turns into a sort of existential stance on the part of Raskolnikov: Raskolnikov would not take the help of Razumikhin, he refuses to eat food, and walks the streets like the one who is suffering and makes the suffering a fact in itself (Dostoevsky, 1991, pp. 9 14). This sort of masochistic activity is how the Camel has to bear not only material suffering but ideational and spiritual burden. He is held in bondage of great theories of morality, greatness, of historical necessity and stands rooted and helpless.

The basis of much of this burden is that Raskolnikov has a very conflicted philosophy, an internal struggle between utilitarianism and the theory of the extraordinary man about which he wrote in a new article in a journal. In it, he hints that great people like Napoleon himself, who are son of great men are above normal morality and can thus commit crimes in the cause of a greater historical means (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 254). Although this belief looks rebellious at the first sight, at this point, Raskolnikov has not committed the next step. Rather, he internalizes the same as another burden and he approaches the question as a thought experiment meant to torture him. He argues that he does not know whether he is morally or psychologically strong enough to confronting himself alongside such remarkable people. Still complying with inherited values but dreaming of something above them, their Camel is Nietzsche and Raskolnikov reflects this contradiction: he is attracted by the desire to break the law of moral, at the same time he retains the feeling of guilt, duty and spiritual humility.

Most prominent of such contradictions is seen in his dealing with his mother and sister. Moral disgust and guilt overwhelm Raskolnikov when he hears about his sister Dunya to marry the scandalous Luzhin in his benefit. He thinks that Dunya is sacrificing her life to him and he is not able to take such kind of love. Why, says he, should she sell herself? Why, on my account should she marry Luzhin? (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 41). In this case, Raskolnikov is the personification of the Camel spirit: he accepts both the necessity to pay this price, though it turns into emotional strain. Rather than acting against this sentimental burden, he lets it bury his personality further in self-hatred and inability.

Even his philosophical excuse of killing is not made possible by the coldness of nihilism but rather its skewed imperative to relieve humanity out of its misery. He thinks that a pawnbroker, Alyona Ivanovna, is a leech that feeds off of the lives of the poor and that her killing would lead to a redistribution of good. He adds, kill her, steal her money and with the help of it dedicate yourself to the service of humanity and the good of all (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 75). It is utilitarian logics rather than criminal that one sees, and it shows the twisted Camel-spirit of Raskolnikov as he is sure that he needs to pay his way to the right to take up life, by sacrifice and moral rectitude. He is not that Lion that gets liberated out of the Thou shalt, he is still the Camel that wants to be justified in his revolt towards nobler purposes. His killing is even presented as a moral test.

Besides, the physical and mental state of Raskolnikov demonstrates how heavy this burden was. He is often discussed as being feverish, delirious and emotionally deadened. His mental torment is not only mental: it is intrapersonal. The murder results in his collapse which brings him out of his senses and makes him completely disconnected with the world around him. The Camel is the ultimate devotee of bearing burdens, and Nietzsche has a spiritual breakdown, and the same breakdown can be discussed as the aspects of psychological degradation of Raskolnikov. He has assimilated incompatible moral logics: Christian compassion, utilitarian sacrifice and nihilist defiance, and the burden of carrying the collection of incompatibles is expressed as neurosis.

Raskolnikov is also haunted with religious and moral guilt. He tries to logically justify this act in his mind, but he fails to get the feeling out of his head that what he has committed was wrong. He imagines beating the pawnbroker to death as it is beaten by a crowd and a suffering horse being beaten to death which is of cruelty and powerlessness (Dostoevsky, 1991, pp. 5558). These visions are his conscience, which is still part of the Christian imagery of morals. He has not gone beyond guilt but he is linked to it. It is due to a morality that internalizes the instincts and poisons the self as Nietzsche claims as the result of the guilt (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 113). Raskolnikov does not only feel guilty about what he has done himself, he is ideologically guilty. He is burdened with the sin of Christians and morality of Enlightenment, which the Camel cannot free himself of.

Another aspect of Raskolnikov that is shown through his interactions with others can be seen in his interactions with Marmeladov, a drunk former government clerk who has an essentially tragic tale of his family suffering; we see again Camel-like identification with sufferings on the part of Raskolnikov. He is the one who listens with pity and shares his final coins and pities Sonya, the daughter of Marmeladov, and is now a prostitute in order to provide the family with bread (Dostoevsky, 1991, pp. 2025). These actions are not crafty but natural. They demonstrate that Raskolnikov has not lost his ability to feel other people or be morally aware and emotionally sensitive. He has not forgotten the weight of the moral feeling of the Camel, but has on the contrary all the definite components of a spiritual crisis in that he has discovered himself unable to reconcile that moral feeling with his philosophical excuses of murder.

At this point, Nietzsche would state that the spirit of the Raskolnikov was still under the domination of the Thou shalt. He has memorized several, and opposing, sets of values: Christianity, rationalism, radical individualism, but he has not as yet achieved their synthesis, or their defeat. The Camel is reactionary but still is strong, but still created by what it delivers and not by what it produces. The unholy actions of Raskolnikov are still not outpouring of any freedom; they are driven by the weight of minds and ideological vagueness. His killing of Alyona Ivanovna is doings of not a sovereign will, but a wrecked Camel who tried to get rid of his needed without still having gained the strength of the Lion.

Section III Raskolnikov, The Lion: The Spirit of Rebellion and Redefining Norms

The second metamorphosis in Nietzsche's 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' is that of the Lion, a creature of strength, defiance, and negation. The Lion comes along as the Camel is not able to pull the weight anymore and moves to the wilderness to challenge the great dragon of the

moral Thou Shalt (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 27). It is not his business to make new values; that is the practice of men of ideas; it is his business, as a Lion, to destroy old values--that is, to say No, obdurately, to the one thing that has been barring his way, that has been encroaching upon his self. In *Crime and Punishment*, the conflict between the passive and active spiritual rebellion is central to Raskolnikov: when his Lion stage culminates in his taking up a knife to kill the pawnbroker. But Nietzsche cautions that we should not make the Lion complete without the child. In the situation with Raskolnikov, the rebellion does not lead to liberation, but to the extreme spiritual downfall. His denial is strong but desperate and his will is divided. He is a Lion and roars with inability to affirm.

The Lion is characterized by the will to power to have its way despite the presence of the moral universe that reigned the Camel. The extremity of the struggles in the metaphor by Nietzsche is the Dragon of Thou Shalt which the Lion battles, with the scales decorated in thousands of years of religious and social injunctions (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 27). The Lion is not ready to kneel before the power of family values, but he stands independently, being released of guilt and duty. The killing of the old pawnbroker, Alyona Ivanovna is the decisive move that Raskolnikov makes to be the Lion according to Nietzsche. This is not a mere crime, it is an act of defiance against metaphysical rule, it is an attempt to defy the conventional morality and prove his dominance.

This mutiny is closely connected with the theory of the extraordinary man stated by Raskolnikov. He is of the opinion that great people in history (such as Napoleon) are allowed to break the moral laws when it allows them to achieve more of the good. A man, who is not ordinary, he asserts, has the right to allow his conscience to wade over certain things, and only when necessary an idea should be executed of his often--perhaps--and for the good of the whole human race (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 254). The theory albeit flawed is a philosophical justification of rebellion. He tries to align himself with the tradition of people, who remake the world by use of force, in killing Alyona, he is, perhaps, attempting to become like the sovereign Nietzschean being who goes beyond good and evil to create new values (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 91).

This seems to be ideal statement of will of the Lion at first look. However, that the Lion is capable of saying only No, as Nietzsche repeatedly states. It is not able to create, but it can destroy. This turns into the major misfortune of Raskolnikov: his revolutionary act lacks the foundation of actual sovereignty and freedom, but it is driven by desperation, insecurity, and a broken will. The Lion is supposed to feel proud and self-affirming but Raskolnikov is still ridden with guilt, delirium and mental fragmentation. The murder soon causes him to get feverish and he falls into hallucination and isolation. Instead of setting him free the murder gets him into more slavery.

This can be evidenced by extreme detachment and confusion that Raskolnikov undergoes following the act. He does not recall how he has perpetrated the crime but goes home dazedly half believing that he has achieved nothing (Dostoevsky, 1991, pp. 8386). The process of his mental degeneration is rapid: His mind appears strange: Everything is unfamiliar: He starts thinking again: he is not himself (p. 89). These have included the fact that his Lion-like act has not resulted in empowerment but dissociation. Nietzsche threatens

the Lion, that and only when it is not able to proceed to the Child it is fatal to dissolve into the abstraction of its own nothingness. This is exactly that which happens to Raskolnikov. He has swept away the moral order, but has not as yet a replacement.

Interaction between Raskolnikov and Sonya comes out as one of the strongest images of failure of the Lion. Sonya embodies one more approach to spiritual strength, the one which goes beyond rebellion and obedience, as she suffers redemptively, and her belief cannot be defeated. By confessing to her Raskolnikov does not only want to be forgiven; he needs the opposite of his self-destruction in the spiritual domain. He states, I killed not the old woman but myself. At this instant I put an end to myself forever... (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 387). This is not the speech of victory but of exigent catastrophe. Raskolnikov was not any Lion by strong, but out of torture. His will to power falls apart into a will to self-destruction.

Although Raskolnikov oscillates between pride and shame even in his confessions, which proves that he is not very stable in the Lion stage. He will not repent in the real sense and he is still hanging on to his theory of being an extraordinary man. When Sonya inquires whether he believes in God, he does not reply but holds onto his point that there are people who need to be allowed to breach the boundaries. He insists, I had only wanted to be brave enough and I killed! then: and maybe it was in a hurry that I sought to know whether I was a louse like the others or a man (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 387). There is thus nothing maturely value-constituting about his insurrection, but only a desire to demonstrate his own power by destruction. Being an act, this turns out to be more of a test, not of justice or even theory, but of identity.

This test results in the one of the most important Nietzschean concepts: the incapability of the weak to become strong indeed. Nietzsche does not encourage random viciousness but he says that the rebel should rebel with the full responsibility of his/her values and consequences of actions. The Lion is powerful because it is sovereign, because it does not want to depend on justification or external meaning. Raskolnikov, though, is in a continuous search of validation, of theory, of Sonya, of suffering. He rebels, but not with personal control. So his Lion phase turns into abjection and ethical corruption, a degradation of Nietzschean perfection.

Furthermore, the reactions of society to the crime committed by Raskolnikov serves as the proof of the fact that his effort to rise above humanity has not achieved success. He dreams that he will be chased, dreaded, and honored but on the contrary, he is despised and looked down with pity. He is not a threat according to the investigating officer Porfiry Petrovich but is a confused young man held in the jaws of ideology. Porfiry informs him; You are sick, you are sick, Rodion Romanovich, you were raging, you did not kill with an axe, you were killing with an idea (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 336). This diagnosis destroys the Raskolnikov fantasy of himself as a Nietzschean. He turns into not a creator of values, but a failed theorist being trapped in the contradictions of his own mind.

Here in the Lion stage of Raskolnikov we find too the critical attitude of Dostoevsky to the thought of Nietzsche, although the thinking of Nietzsche comes later than that of Dostoevsky, and it is difficult to speak of the kinship of the two thinkers except in the retrospect. Now it is hard not to think that Dostoevsky is anticipating the model created by

Nietzsche and pushing the boundaries of the model. The Lion in *Crime and Punishment* is not heroic destructionist, but a tortured person, whose protest will result only in internal disintegration. Dostoevsky melodramatizes the price of non-transcendence. In contrast to Nietzsche, whose vision of the negation of the Lion is the anticipation of a cheerful creation, Dostoevsky, comes with a halt on the pit, proving that the uprising devoid of grace and love will never result in the integrity.

Perhaps, the most graphic example of this failure was the dream of Raskolnikov of the world sickened with a virus that sent people mad, each typing of his or her absolute truth. Both considered themselves infallible and did not feel good when they were not recognized as correct by other people, something which led to the death of each other (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 490). The same dream reflects the route of the Lion without a mission, where there is no such thing as a future, every individual is a Lion devoid of a Child, in an endless state of rebellion, inability to create something common, or meaningful. The idea the world is mad leads one to see how destructive uncontrolled subjectivity is, and how a will to power in such a world results only in violence.

The journey of Raskolnikov into the Lion stage comes to a point of submission, but not the realization of the Camelhood again- that is a forced humiliation caused by the experience of suffering, not by understanding. He admits, yet, even in Siberia, he is still cold-blooded and he does not believe that he is guilty but that he is wrong. All he did was make a mistake. What I killed was not a human kind... I killed a principle!, he explains to himself (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 465). This could turn into a tragic stasis, according to Nietzsche, as Raskolnikov has removed old values but is not yet able to attest to his own. The Lion is still half-way roaring unable to turn into the Child who plays and creates.

Section III: Raskolnikov the Child - Redemption and Renewal and Creative Becoming

In the third transformation of the spirit, CS- Child, the person is at last transferred to a paradise of innocence, creativity, and power of affirmation. Following the heavy humiliation of the Camel and the defiant negation of the Lion, the spirit will have to be converted into a Child: able to play, create imaginations and values that it affirms to itself (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 28). The Child is not only negating old values, but recreates values out of itself, and in this is the highest expression of the will to power, not through domination of things, but through joyous affirmation of life. In the *Crime and Punishment*, the journey of Raskolnikov to this level is not spontaneous and smooth. Not so glorious and sovereign as the idealization of Nietzsche, his transformation, Dostoevsky almost brings a touching analog of the end-determining metamorphosis in the rebirth of Raskolnikov in Siberia. Under the lead of Sonya and his own profound misery, Raskolnikov starts losing his pride and rationalism and opens himself to new kind of life, not the life of intellectual pre-eminence, but the life of humility, love and moral regeneration.

The earliest symptoms of this turnabout come not by the feeling of realization philosophically, but through sheer emotional and spiritual exhaustion. Having confessed and having been exiled, Raskolnikov feels weak physically and spiritually dead. He sticks to his

theory saying that he only did a simple mistake and that he had no right to step over him (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 465). It means that Lion has not lost everything in his logic: he tries to justify something by the ideology. But the coldness of such world-view is more and more obvious. In the state of isolation and disillusion, he is not satisfied with the fact that his hypothesis is proved or disproved. His metaphysical revolt has not brought him to exaltation, but to the agonies, and he too starts out to discover the boundary of the mind not supplemented by love.

The appearance of Sonya in Siberia turns out to be the stimulus of gradual evolving Raskolnikov into the Child stage. His pride and theory are poles apart with the values of faith and humility that Sonya possesses, and she is the one that the Lion wanted to ruin. She has embraced her suffering without being bitter, she is still always compassionate and believes in God. Raskolnikov does not yield to her earlier but imagines that there is no spiritual weakness and her devotion and non-objective love start touching him. Nietzsche's Child represents a return to innocence not ignorance, but a post-critical state of openness and renewal. Sonya is the person who contributes to Raskolnikov coming back to this quality not by preaching to him or convicting him, but by spending time silently with him in his presence.

A turning point in which he would be transformed comes not by words, but by event-when Raskolnikov becomes sick in Siberia and in a fever dreams about a plague that would cover the whole world. The dream consists of individuals being infected with a virus which makes them think that they are infallible and this results into social disarray and violence. Each of them considered himself invulnerable, and was hurt when his opinion was not accepted by others, not to mention that they did not understand who and how to judge and whom to take as evil and whom as good (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 490). This dream expresses what goes on within Raskolnikov: the psychological and ideological disintegration of uninhibited individualism and the loss of the common moral values. It is an epiphany moment, an allegory of a world without the Child, a world of pure destruction of Lion, where nothing new can be created.

After the sleeping, Raskolnikov starts experiencing the awakening of a new consciousness. The dream shows him that rebel without love results in insanity. It is the first time when he creates an opportunity to look at Sonya not as a savior or ideological antithesis, but as a human being. The text gives an account that he had now regained consciousness and saw it all and that slowly memory, an image of what he had committed, began to arise before him in its immense horror (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 491). And this is not guilt only, this becomes empathy and humility. He does not identify himself anymore as the extraordinary man, but a person desiring to be loved and ethically repaired.

It is during this mini silence of post-crisis awareness when the Child starts to take shape. According to Nietzsche, the Child uttering a sacred Yes to life, is playing artistically with meaning (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 28). Raskolnikov is still not fully ready to make such an affirmation, but his last acts indicate that this might be possible. In the epilogue of the novel he also reaches out to the hand of Sonya, and this time not as a homelier, but as a friend. The narrator says, he thought a sudden thought that he could live again because life had not died in him (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 492). It is not a moment of triumph, of drama: it is hushed; it is

inward; it is full of human reality. It implies that Raskolnikov starts to live neither as a puzzle that needs to be solved, nor as a theory that should be proved, but as a thing to enjoy. His previous nihilism leads to connectivity.

Notably, this is not the kind of transformation that was provided structurally in the terms of rational enlightenment; rather, it is a spiritual resurrection. It is defined in religious terms in the text: the new story was beginning, there was a gradual renewal of a man (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 493), which is a paraphrase of the life in the present over an abstract conflict. Nietzsche directly had a negative view on Christian morality, but he did care about the concept of resurrection as a symbol of change. In Raskolnikov, the spiritual regeneration does not oppose the ideal posed by Nietzsche, yet it depicts his idea in a modified cultural manner. The Child is considered the creative innocence not always pagan joyful, it could be the peaceful regeneration of morale after the fall.

It is worth noting that Dostoevsky's conception of the final metamorphosis diverges from Nietzsche's in one essential way: where Nietzsche emphasizes 'self-creation', Dostoevsky stresses 'grace and love' as the basis for transformation. In the case of Nietzsche, the Child produces new values out of the will to power. Instead, the newness of Raskolnikov according to Dostoevsky comes with his giving up of the love of the other and entering into the moral realm once again. This difference is important. Nietzsche has a Child that is independent, aesthetic and immediate; Dostoevsky has a Child, which is dependent, moral and submissive. However, even though there is a difference in the development of this philosophical approach, the two philosophers share the view that nothing can be changed until the ego is killed.

Accordingly, although not exemplary of the positive creation as Nietzsche saw it, there is an essential feature of becoming involved in the rebirth of Raskolnikov. The Child is he who comes out when the world falls down, who rejoices at vulnerability and innocence when pride has been defeated. The possibility of such becoming lies in the account of how Raskolnikov might arrive at what is left open by Dostoevsky at the end of the novel. He has lost his theories and pride. The only thing left is an openness to life, and it is correlated with his silent relationship with Sonya and the increasingly definite feeling of people being united.

The last stage provides Raskolnikov with a complete metamorphosis as a Nietzschean. The Camel carried moral and ideological burden; the Lion shed them away with an act of violence, and the Child starts to rediscover the world in the spirit of humility and the chance of love. He is not yet the maker of values in the Nietzschean manner, although he has lost his reactive identity upon which he was bound. In that meaning he is at the edge of affirmation a human being to be born into life, maybe not the Nietzschean to the *Übermensch*, but a man reborn, nevertheless.

Conclusion:

Dostoevsky's 'Crime and Punishment' offers one of the most compelling psychological and philosophical portraits of a man in crisis caught between inherited morality, rationalist ideology, and existential despair. Fitting Raskolnikov's change into the tripartite symbolic scheme of the three metamorphoses, advanced by Friedrich Nietzsche, the Camel, the Lion,

and the Child, we will discover that a more complex construction is presented on the screen that does not differ between crimes and redemption in its path of growth. Viewed through this lens, it is possible to gain a much more subtle appreciation of the inner evolution of the protagonist as a spiritual and philosophical process: the process of submitting, of burdened intellectualization, the passage through violent rebelliousness, ignoring, and concluding--with all its flaws and with all its authenticity--in the prospect of rejuvenation and affirmation of life.

In the 'Camel phase', Raskolnikov is burdened by duty, social expectation, and intellectual pride. He lives silently but hurts intensively under the burden of conflicting ideologies. He is not submitting himself to God or even tradition but those imposed by the forms of moral rigor and utility. And similar to Camel of Nietzsche, he takes them in and is holding them as a load that he has not mustered the merits to disrupt or cross over in criticizing them (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 27). This stage is also characterized by paralysis and inability to take action even when one is within a lot of inner conflict.

The 'Lion phase' is catalysed by the murder of the pawnbroker, an act Raskolnikov commits as an experiment in self-transcendence. This apostasy is towards traditional morality the same as those of the Lion in Nietzsche who fights off great dragon of the "Thou Shalt" in order to be independent (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 27). Nevertheless, the revolt of Raskolnikov does not have any basis of real strength or the sense of purpose. It is marred with guilt, fear, and philosophy abstraction. Instead of freeing him up, the crime sets on a road towards sickness, separation, and spiritual breakdown. The no that he claims is not a no that Nietzsche considers as the power to become creative.

Only in the final 'Child phase' does Raskolnikov begin to experience a new kind of openness to life. His repentance, exile and the passive friendship with Sonya bring him in fact the stumbling start of rebirth, not into victory and ideological certitude, but into sensitivity, self-reliance, the hope of moral renewal. Nietzsche Child symbolizes adaptive capacity of the spirit to playfully invent new values as well as to say a sacred Yes to being (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 28). The fact that Raskolnikov wakes up in the end of the novel proclaims his sense of being in love with Sonya and his willingness to continue his life, which is some sort of affirmation of life regardless of guilt, pride or rebellion (Dostoevsky, 1991, p. 492).

By tracing Raskolnikov's journey through Nietzsche's three metamorphoses, this study reframes 'Crime and Punishment' as more than a Christian narrative of sin and salvation. It turns into a philosophical meditation on the encounter of collapsing ethical universe by the modern subject and excruciating existential becoming. In the end, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche may disagree with each other towards the end the single manner in which we should approach change, which is through the view of grace not self-creation, but both peoples share the same vision of not only the need to rebel but the courage and strength to start all over again.

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